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Class Action vs. Arbitration: Does
TILA Support Class Actions in
Arbitration Where Statutory Rights
are Concerned?
Johnson v. West Suburban Bank'

I. INTRODUCTION
Johnson v. West Suburban Bank is an important case in American jurisprudence
because it combines several United States Supreme Court cases to establish a test for
whether arbitration provisions relating to statutory rights should be upheld when they
essentially preclude class actions. This Casenote will examine the progression the
courts have taken and Johnson's subsequent test. Finally, an evaluation of this test
will follow.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff Terry Johnson ("Johnson") desired to bring a class action against
Defendants County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware ("Bank") and Tele-Cash,
Inc., Bank's agent in the transaction. 2 Johnson and Bank entered into a short-term
loan on July 10, 1998.' The amount of the loan was $250.4 The two-week loan
resulted in an $88 finance charge, which translated into an annual percentage rate of
917%.' The agreement required Johnson to make a one time payment of S338 two
weeks after he received his loan.'
The loan agreement between Johnson and Bank contained an arbitration
provision.' This provision declared that any dispute regarding the loan, no matter
who brought it, would be arbitrated The arbitration provision also stated that since
the loan was involved in interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act "("FAA")
governed the arbitration provision.' 0 Furthermore, the loan agreement expressly

1. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000).

2. Id.
at 368.
3. M.at 369.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. hi.
7. Id.
8. I. The provision specified the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum as the

governing rules. Id.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16(1994).
10. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369.
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notified Johnson that by signing the loan he waived his right to litigate any matters
concerning the loan."
Johnson filed a judicial claim, on behalf of himself and an assumed class of
others in similar circumstances, with the District Court of Delaware. 2 Johnson
contended that Bank and Tele-Cash violated two statutes, the Truth in Lending Act 3
("TILA") and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 4 ("EFTA"). 5 First, Bank and TeleCash did not give sufficient disclosure of the high rate of interest.' 6 Second, Bank
and Tele-Cash required loan applicants to open an account.' 7 Before loan approval,
Bank and Tele-Cash required the loan applicants to authorize electronic fund
transfers from that account to pay off the loan.'" This preauthorization was
irrevocable. 9
Bank and Tele-Cash requested a stay of the proceedings and a motion to compel
arbitration. 20 The loan agreement specifically waived any judicial forum and
established that any dispute about the loan should be settled by means of
arbitration.2'
To keep his claim in court, Johnson argued that the arbitration provision
conflicted with the purposes of TILA and EFTA.22 Johnson proposed that Congress'
intent toward these statutes was to encourage district courts to provide for class
actions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23 Johnson further
contended that Congress' intent to promote class actions could be found in the
statutes' legislative history.24 Johnson claimed that allowing class actions under
TILA and EFTA helps discourage violations-a public policy goal.25
The District Court of Delaware ruled for Johnson, declaring that there existed
a significant conflict between the statutes and arbitration.26 The district court
subsequently denied Bank and Tele-Cash's motion to compel arbitration.27 Bank and
Tele-Cash appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.2" The appellate court
reversed the district court, ruling that there was no significant conflict between
TILA, EFTA, and arbitration under the FAA.2 9 Moreover, the appellate court.
recognized that congressional intent towards the FAA should be considered in

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 370.
Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
Johnson, 225 F.3d at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 368-69. Rule 23 provides the requirements for class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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determining if an arbitration agreement should be enforced.3" Furthermore, upon
looking at the text of the statutes, their respectful legislative histories, and their
purposes, the court could not find congressional intent to deem class actions more
important than arbitration provisions within a contract.3
The appellate court held: when there exists an arbitration provision that
essentially prevents a class action under statutory rights, the courts must examine
congressional intent as provided in the text of the statute, the statute's legislative
history, and the purpose of the statute, while taking into consideration Congress'
purpose of enacting the FAA and if the objecting party can still be adequately
vindicated by arbitration, to determine if the arbitration provision is enforceable or
not.32

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND33
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The question of whether arbitration provisions are enforceable when plaintiffs
attempt to bring a class action suit on grounds of violation of TILA and EFTA is one
of first impression for the courts of appeal.3 However, there have been several
district courts that have dealt with this question, many allowing for arbitration." As
a result, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals used several United States Supreme
Court cases concerning related matters to aid in determining what the ruling should
be concerning class action suits under TILA and EFTA versus arbitration clauses."
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."
The United States Supreme Court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc. in 1985.3" Mitsubishi Motors Corp. ("Mitsubishi") filed for
an order of arbitration39 against Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ("Soler") in the

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 368-79.
33. EFTA contains class action recovery provisions that are substantially similar to TI LA. d. at 378.
Therefore this Casenote will mainly examine TILA.
34. Id. at 370.
35. Id. Compare Thompson v. Illinois Title Loans, Inc., No. 99-C-3952, 2000 WL 45493 (N.D.Ill.
Jan. 11,2000) (holding that a substantive right to a class action is not created within TILA), and Lopez
Apr. 25, 1996) (stating that Congress does not create
v. Plaza Fin. Co., 1996 WL 210073, at *3 (N.D. 111.
a rightper se,just puts limits on class action liability-TILA neitherrequires nor grants substantive right
to class action), with Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc. 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (W.D. Mich.
2000) (holding that the "[r]emedial purposes of TILA are substantially defeated or impaired by
arbitration clauses" and rejecting defendant's motion to compel arbitration because arbitration clause
was unconscionable).
36. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 370-71.
37. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
38. Id. at 614.
39. Mitsubishi brought its arbitration action under the FAA and the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Id.
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United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico because the two
°
companies disagreed about who breached the sales agreement between them. The
sales agreement contained an arbitration provision that provided for arbitration if
there existed a breach of the agreement.4 Soler's counterclaim contained, among
other things, allegations of violations of the Sherman Act.4 2 The Puerto Rico district
43
court ordered arbitration of all the complaint issues and most of the counterclaims.
Even though antitrust claims are normally not arbitrable, the district court said that
the international nature of the business relationship called for arbitration on the
antitrust issues as well. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's opinion with the exception of the antitrust issues.45
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide what an American
court's duty is when an arbitration agreement concerns antitrust claims within an
international transaction.46 The Supreme Court ruled that "if Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or
legislative history., 41 The Supreme Court continued by stating that the parties
should be held to arbitration if they all agree to arbitrate unless Congress has shown
48
an intention not to allow judicial remedy waivers for the statutory rights at issue.
Furthermore, it is the party contesting the arbitration that must show Congress'
intent.49 Since Soler agreed to arbitration by signing the sales agreement with
Mitsubishi, Soler was held to arbitration unless Congress had shown an intent to the
contrary within the Sherman Act.5 The text and legislative history did not show
5
Congress having such a contrary intent in regard to an international context. '
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act was subject to arbitration
under the FAA. 2
2. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd"
4
The Supreme Court also decided Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd in 1985.
In 1981, Lamar Byrd ("Byrd") invested $160,000 in securities from Dean Witter

40. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 617-19.

41. Id. at 617. The arbitration clause also provided lbr arbitration of "[aill disputes, controversies or
differences which may arise between [Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or inrelation to Articles I-13 through
Id.
I..."
V of this Agreement .
42. Id. at 620. The Sherman Act is an anti-trust statute. 15 U.S.C. § I.
43. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 620-21.
44. Id. at 621.
45. Id. at 621-22.
46. Id. at 624.
47. Id. at 628.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 628-29. The Supreme Court said this applied only to an international context and refused
to look at the issue from a domestic context. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 629.
53. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
54. Id. at 213.
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Reynolds Inc. ("Witter")." Within about five months, the account value fell more
than $100,000.56 Byrd filed a cause of action for several pendent state law issues and
federal securities issues against Witter in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California." Upon investing, Byrd signed a Customer's
Agreement that called for arbitration of all disputes stemming from the agreement."
Witter subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration of the pendent state law
issues and sever the federal securities issues to be resolved in a federal judicial
forum.59 Witter's motion for severing the federal issues from the pendent state issues
and compelling arbitration of the state issues was denied by the district court. 6' The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an interlocutory appeal.6 ,
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of
whether, when a claim raises both federal securities issues and pendent state issues,
a federal district court can deny compelling arbitration of pendent state issues of law
even though the parties had agreed to arbitrate. 62 The Court considered the
legislative history of the FAA to determine Congress' intent regarding whether or
not arbitration should be compelled in the case at issue.63 Congress intended to place
arbitration provisions "upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs."'64
Moreover, Congress wanted to override the long judiciary tradition of not enforcing
arbitration agreements. 6 Furthermore, Congress' primary concern, and reason for
passing the FAA, was to "enforce private agreements into which partes had
entered., 66 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that arbitration of pendent state
claims should be compelled to protect both the contractual rights of the parties and
their FAA rights, unless another federal statute sufficiently says otherwise. 7
3. Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon"8
The United States Supreme Court decided Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v.
McMahon in 1987.69 Eugene and Julia McMahon ("McMahon"), as trustees and
individually, were customers of Shearson/American Express Inc. ("Shearson")
between 1980 and 1982.70 Julia McMahon signed two customer agreements that
contained arbitration provisions for any controversies concerning the agreements. 7'
In 1984, McMahon filed an amended cause of action against Shearson with the

55. Id. at 214.
56. Id.
57. Id. Jurisdiction of the federal court was based on diversity of citizenship. Id.
58. Id. at 215.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 215-16.
61. Id. at 216.
at 214.
62. Id.
at 218-21.
63. Id.
64. H.R. REP. No. 96, at 1 (1924).
65. This tradition came from English common law. See Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6.
66. Id. at 221.
67. Id. In other words, Congress must sufficiently express its intent to limit the FAA.
68. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
69. Id. at 220.
70. Id. at 222-23.
71. Id. at 223.
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 193472 ("Exchange Act"), the Racketeer
74
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act73 ("RICO"), and state laws. Shearson
75
moved to compel arbitration under the two consumer agreements. The district
court ruled that McMahon's Exchange Act and state law claims were arbitrable, but
the RICO claims were not arbitrable because the federal government had great
6
interest in the enforcement of such claims by federal courts. The appellate court
agreed with the district court that the state laws were arbitrable and "public policy"
called for judicial forums for RICO claims but reversed the lower court concerning
7
the Exchange Act, declaring that Exchange Act claims were not arbitrable.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Exchange
Act claims and RICO claims are arbitrable. 78 The Supreme Court observed that the
79
FAA, by itself, "mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.
However, a contrary congressional directive can overrule the FAA in particular
statutes, leaving it up to the party opposing arbitration to show Congress' intent."
McMahon did not sufficiently show that Congress intended to deny arbitration under
the Exchange Act or RICO." Therefore, the Supreme Court overruled the appellate
court and remanded the matter for arbitration. 2
83
4. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.84 In 1981, Robert Gilmer ("Gilmer") took a job with Interstate/Johnson
8
Lane Corporation ("Interstate") as Manager of Financial Services. A requirement
of employment was to register with several stock exchanges as a securities
representative, which Gilmer did.86 The application for the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") contained an arbitration provision. 7 This arbitration provision
stated that Gilmer and Interstate would arbitrate disputes as required by the stock
Rule 347 of the NYSE provided for
exchanges that Gilmer registered with.
arbitration of employment matters.89 Gilmer was fired by Interstate in 1987 at the

72. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
74. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. 224.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 226.

80. Id.

at 242.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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age of sixty-two. 90 Gilmer filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 9' He then filed a complaint of
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196792
("ADEA"), as amended, with the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina. 93 Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration under the
registration application and Rule 347 of the NYSE. 94 Interstate claimed that the FAA
mandated compelling arbitration. 5 The district court denied Interstate's motion for
arbitration, ruling that Congress intended to protect the ADEA from compelled
arbitration and ensure a judicial forum for its claimants. 96 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that neither the legislative history
and purpose of the ADEA nor the statutory text provide substantial proof that
Congress intended to exclude arbitration from the ADEA.97
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of
whether an arbitration agreement should be enforceable when the issue lies within
the ADEA. 9' The Court again reiterated that arbitration agreements concerning
statutory claims are enforceable because of the FAA. 99 The Court recognized that
it was Gilmer's responsibility to show Congress' intent against arbitration
enforcement within the ADEA.' ° The test to determine Congress' intent is to look
at the text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an existing "inherent conflict"
between the purposes of the ADEA and arbitration.'0 ' Gilmer attempted to argue
02
However,
that arbitration of ADEA issues would hinder important social policies.
the Supreme Court believed that arbitration was as capable as a judicial forum in
handling such social policies.'0 3 Gilmer also argued that arbitration was not adequate
for relief because it did not provide for class actions. 0 4 To this the Supreme Court
answered that the individual is not barred from relief even if not allowed to bring a
class action.'0 5 Furthermore, just because the individual signed a compulsory
arbitration agreement, this does not preclude the EEOC from bringing and obtaining
equitable relief for class actions. 0 6 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that
compulsory arbitration is allowed concerning statutory issues arising from the
ADEA.' °7

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
93. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 27.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 30.
105. Id. at 32.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 35.
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B. Truth in Lending Act
Subchapter I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act is short-titled Truth in
Lending Act.08 TILA's purpose is to make sure consumers have information about
the credit terms of their prospective loans." 9 Section 1640 provides for the remedies
and how to determine the quantity of such remedies for violations of TILA."0 As
§ 1640 relates to class actions, it provides for a maximum amount.' and 2lists the
'
factors to be considered in determining the remedies for the case at hand

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals made a step-by-step progression in Johnson
to reach its outcome of overruling the district court and compelling arbitration under
TILA and EFTA." 3 The appellate court focuses mainly on TILA, stating that the
same examination of EFTA can be made and the same outcome results.'
First, the appellate court looked at the statutory language of TILA. "' The court
acknowledged that within TILA there exists civil liability for inadequate disclosure
by the lender." 6 Furthermore, the court agreed that TILA addresses class actions,
but only in a manner that limits remedies available under TILA, and give factors for
considering such remedies."i7 The court concluded that the "right" to a class action
is a procedural right stemming from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.''
Furthermore, because the text ofTILA does not show congressional intent to provide
for a statutory right of class action under TILA, the court held that a right to a class
action under TILA does not exist within the text of TILA." 9
The court then proceeded to consider TILA's legislative history.' 20 The court
examined the Senate and House Reports concerning amendments that have been
made to TILA.' 2' The court then ruled that since the legislative history does not
explicitly exclude arbitration, Johnson needed to22show that irreconcilable conflicts
exist between arbitration and TILA's purposes.

108. 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1693.
109. Id.§ 1601.
110. Id. § 1640.

111. Id. § 1640(a)(2)(B). The maximum amount is the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the
creditor's net worth. Id.
112. Id. § 1640(a)(4). These factors include, but are not limited to, "the amount of any actual
damages awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures ofcompliance by the creditor, the resources
of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure
of compliance was intentional." Id.
113. Johnson, 225 F.3d 366.
114. Idat 378-79.
115. Id. at 371.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Rule 23 governs arbitration. FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.
119. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 371.
120. Id. at 371-73.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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The court split TILA's purposes into two sections: public policy goals and
substantive rights. 2 ' Johnson argued that class action awards serve as penalties for
violating lenders under TILA, in which the attorneys act as "private attorneys
general," and that class actions serve more of a deterrence than individual claims or
arbitration would.'24 The court rejected this argument, finding that individual claims
and arbitration do not necessarily provide less deterrence than class actions and that
25
class actions are not required to meet TILA's other goals.' The court continued by
stating that the rights created under TILA are not foreclosed from the individual
26
Moreover, the
because he or she has to bring an individual claim or arbitrate.
court relied on Gilmer to rule that because Johnson does not lose his statutory rights
if compelled to arbitrate under the arbitration agreement of the loan, the statute's
27
public policy goals do not outweigh arbitration. Furthermore, the court found that
2
an individual's incentive to seek remedies under TILA is not quashed.' The court
then contended that factors outside of consideration of TILA must be examined,
29
The court looked to Dean
specifically Congress' intent in enacting the FAA.
Witter, to decide that because there is a question as to whether irreconcilable
conflicts exist between arbitration and TILA, FAA goals should be considered on
equal footing with TILA public policy goals in determining if compulsory arbitration
under an arbitration agreement is enforceable. 30
The court then addressed substantive rights' 3' and again looked to Gilmer for
guidance. 132 The Supreme Court in Gilmerstill allowed for arbitration when it ruled
that even if a class action remedy is available, it does not mean that the parties
cannot bargain around it as long as the waiver allows for adequate vindication of the
dispute. 3 3 Therefore, because TILA allows for adequate vindication within the
arbitration context, Johnson must be compelled to arbitrate in34accordance with the
arbitration agreement on the loan application that he signed.
The subsequent test the court decided on to determine if an arbitration
agreement concerning statutory rights is enforceable, even if it basically precludes
a class action remedy, is as follows: (1) Congress' intent to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum must be explicitly deducible from looking at the text of the statute in
question, the statute's legislative history, and the statute's purposes; (2) Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA, namely to encourage arbitration, must be held on equal
footing as the statute in question's purpose; and (3) even if Congress does allow for

123. Id. at 373-78.
124. Id. at 373.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 374.
128. Id. The court goes on to say that recovery could be lower under class action because there is a
cap on class action suits, and because attorney's fees are available in the judicial forum, attorney's fees
should be available under arbitration. Id.
129. Id. at 375.
130. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 376.
131. Id. at 377-79.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 377.
134. Id. at 378.
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class actions within the statute in question, if the opposing party's rights can be
adequately vindicated, arbitration should not be precluded.'

V. COMMENT
Johnson basically states that when a request for a class action goes up against
an arbitration provision, the arbitration provision will win unless the contesting party
can show without a doubt that Congress intended for a class action override, or that
without the class action the party would not be able to get an adequate remedy.""6
It has been argued that mandatory arbitration agreements that preclude class action
litigation are unconscionable because they do not give plaintiffs an effective
Plaintiffs with small claims are not able to consolidate their disputes
remedy.'
under an arbitration agreement and really cannot afford to arbitrate the dispute on an
individual basis. 3 8 However, courts have not accepted this argument.3 9
So how is the "little guy" going to get redress? The appellate court in Johnson
contends that administrative bodies will be able to keep the violating entity in line. 40
How persuasive is this really? Not all statutes are patrolled by administrative
agencies, and those that are have agencies that are too small to handle the
caseload.' 4' Therefore, the administrative agency has to pick and choose, leaving
some small-claims plaintiffs without a remedy. Allowing the potential plaintiff to
combine with similarly positioned parties helps the ruling administrative body in
many ways. It allows the administrative body to focus on other violating entities.
It serves as a deterrent, ensuring that other potential violating entities know that they
cannot get away with violations because there is an effective way for harmed
plaintiffs to achieve justice. In short, there is a public policy-stopping small claims
violators-that suggests that class actions should be allowed.
Another way for class actions to win over arbitration provisions is for Congress
to be more explicit in its legislation. Courts look to legislative intent to determine
if an arbitration provision can set aside a plaintiff's ability to join a class action.
Sometimes legislative intent toward such an issue is extremely difficult to fathom
from the statute or legislative history. 4 1 If Congress specifically mentioned within

135. Id. at 368-79.
136. Id.
137. See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Materialson Pre-disputeArbitrationClauses, 1172 PLI/Corp. 113,15962 (2000); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory BindingArbitration Meets the Class Action. Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1, 78-82 (2000).
138. Bland, Jr., supra note 137: Stemlight, supra note 137.
139. See Stemlight, supra note 137, at 56-60.
140. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377-78.
141. Stemlight, supra note 137, at 81.
142. Especially when the legislature is basically silent, i.e., TILA and class action veisus arbitration.
However, it may be argued that at least some class actions under TILA are discouraged. In 1995, the
United States Congress placed a five-month moratorium on certain TI LA class actions. Truth in Lending
Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No 104-12, 109 Stat 161 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1640 (Supp. IV 1998). The Congressional Record shows that Congress was reacting to the case of
Rodash v. AIB. Mortgage Co., 16 F.3d 1146 (1994). Congress claimed that as a result of the Eleventh
Circuit Court rescinding a mortgage loan because of technicalities, too many class actions were being
filed and that a moratorium was needed in order fbr Congress to address the issue. 141 Cong. Rec. 66,
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the statute or the legislative history the exclusion of judicial forum waivers, the
plaintiff would be allowed to join a class action.'43 However, this will take time to
persuade Congress to do. If, in fact, it is possible to persuade Congress to do.
It is understandable that the courts want to balance the respective sides in order
to determine whether or not arbitration provisions should be upheld. Arbitration
provisions are very useful in many situations. However, instead of looking at only
the availability of administrative remedies, maybe courts should look at the
likelihood of administrative remedies. How long would it take for the ruling
administrative body to get around to the plaintiff's claim versus the ability of the
plaintiff to take the claim to court? If it is more efficient or more just to allow the
plaintiff to join a class action and go to court, why not allow it?
There will be times, probably most of the time, that arbitration provisions should
be upheld, even if it essentially precludes the plaintiff from a class action. However,
the courts should take these situations very seriously. If the plaintiff is precluded
from a class action and the ruling administrative body is too busy to deal with the
violating defendant, then the plaintiff may be out of a satisfactory remedy or out of
a remedy completely. The plaintiff still has the possibility of arbitration, but it may
not be a satisfactory remedy, either because of economics or time and trouble.

VI. CONCLUSION
The debate concerning arbitration provisions versus the ability to form a class
action is far from over. In fact, it has just begun. There are many federal statutes
that the courts will have to examine to determine if an arbitration provision should
be enforced or not because it waives a judicial forum and essentially precludes the
formation of a class action. Johnson is precedent for future courts to look at in their
determinations. Hopefully, courts will see that the ability, not just the availability,
of administrative bodies working for plaintiffs' remedies should also be considered
in their determinations.
CHRISTINA

S.

LEWIS

S5614-15. Senator D'Amato claimed that "[t]he threat of rescissions on so massive a scale could wreck

havoc on our mortgage lending system and the secondary mortgage markets." 1(. at S5615. Then in
September of 1995, Congress passed the Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995. Pub. L. No 104-

29, 109 Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). From the Congressional
Record, it looks as if Congress was more interested in protecting the lender and not the consumer's
ability to file class actions. See 141 Cong. Rec. 152, H9513-16 and 140 Cong. Rec. 149, S15450.
143. See Stemlight, supra note 137, at 120-22.
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